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TORT

LAW-COMMON LAW DRAM SHOP ACTS:
NEGLIGENCE PER SE-Munford, Inc. v.

Peterson, 368 So. 2d 213 (Miss. 1979).
On May 29, 1975 Scott Peterson and four other minors were involved in an automobile accident in Harrison County, Mississippi, in
which Peterson was killed. Evidence disclosed that the group had purchased beer at a convenience store on three separate occasions during
the evening. No request was made for verification of the minors' ages
by a store employee. The parents and brothers of the deceased
brought suit against Munford, Inc., the owner and operator of the
Majik Mart convenience store for the wrongful death of Peterson. The
jury in the lower court entered a verdict in favor of the Petersons and
assessed damages at $100,000. The Mississippi Supreme Court held'
that Munford's actions in selling the beer to the minors amounted to
negligence per se under section 67-3-53(b) of the Mississippi Code Annotated.2 The court, however, reversed and remanded the lower
court's decision based upon a jury instruction3 which precluded a
determination of the decedent's possible contributory negligence. The
court deemed the instruction prejudicial and found that it constituted
reversible error.4
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ALCOHOL SALE LIABILITY

At common law a vendor of intoxicating liquors was not liable to
a person injured by one to whom the liquor had been sold. Courts construed the consumption of the alcohol as the proximate cause of the
5
accident and found the sale of the intoxicant as too remote.
State legislatures, however, responding to the mechanization of
society, the need for public safety, and the desire to control unbridled
sale of alcohol adopted so-called Dram Shop Acts.6 These acts attach
'Munford, Inc. v. Peterson, 368 So. 2d 213 (Miss. 1979).
'Miss. CODE ANN. § 67-3-53(b) (Supp. 1978) which provides:
In addition to any act declared to be unlawful by this chapter, or by sections
27-71-301 to 27-71-347, Mississippi Code of 1972, and sections 67-3-17,
67-3-27, 67-3-29, and 67-3-57, it shall be unlawful for the holder of a permit
authorizing the sale of beer or wine at retail:
(b) To sell, give, or furnish any beer or wine to any person visibly or
noticeably intoxicated, or to any insane person, or to any habitual drunkard,
or to any person under the age of eighteen (18) years.
'368 So. 2d at 218. The instruction read: "The court instructs the jury that as a matter of law in this case, the plaintiff's decedent was not negligent, nor at fault, nor to
blame for his death; and cannot be charged with any negligence or fault." Id.
1d. at 218-19.
'Hamm v. Carson City Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358 (1969).
'For a list of those states which have legislatively enacted Dram Shop Acts see 12
Am. Jur. Trials 733-35 (1966).
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civil liability to vendors of intoxicating liquors for damages caused by
their overindulgent customers.'
In some states where the legislature has failed to adopt dram shop
legislation, courts have established judicial liability for those who sell
intoxicants in violation of state statutes regulating its sale. The New
Jersey Supreme Court appears to have begun the erosion of the common law nonliability by holding that a vendor who sells alcoholic
beverages to a minor should foresee the risk of harm the transaction
creates, not only to the minor, but to members of the traveling public
as well.8 The court, in determining foreseeability, gave great consideration to the fact that the minor was traveling in a dangerous instrument, an automobile.'
Florida, which has no Dram Shop Act, has tackled the problem of
imposing civil liability on alcohol vendors in several judicial decisions. In Davis v. Shiappacossee,' a drive-in alcohol vendor sold
twenty-four cans of beer and a half pint of whiskey to three minors
who subsequently were involved in an automobile accident in which
one of the group was killed. The court found the vendor civilly liable.
The court reasoned that it was within the realm of foreseeability that
a minor in an automobile to whom liquor was sold may later be involved in an accident." The court based its decision on the doctrine of
negligence per se since a Florida statute 2forbidding the sale of
alcoholic beverages to a minor was violated.'
The Florida court, however, fourteen years later, in 1977, refused
to extend this reasoning beyond the limits in Davis. In Bryant v. lax
Liquors," a minor not involved in the sale, was injured at a high
school initiation proceeding as a result of consumption of intoxicants.
The court held this to be beyond the foreseeability of the vendor and
too remote to extend liability.' The court's decision in Davis was further limited in 1978 by United Services Automobile Association v.
Butler." In that case a minor was killed in an automobile accident
after being served alcoholic beverages at a party. The Florida court
reasoned that common law liability could not be extended to a social
host, but must be restricted to those transactions framed in a commercial setting.' 6
'See Roberts v. Casey, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 89, 225 A.2d 839 (1966); Iszler v. Jorda, 80
N.W.2d 665 (1957), Annot. 64 A.L.R.2d 696 (1959); Hartwig v. Loyal Order of Moose,
253 Minn. 347, 91 N.W.2d 794 (1958), Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 459 (1961).
Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
'Id. at 6, 8.
*155 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1963).
"Id. at 367.
1Id.
"352 So. 2d 542 (Fla. App. 1977).
"Id. at 544.
"359 So. 2d 498 (Fla. App. 1978).
"Id. at 500.
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DRAM SHOP ACTS

A number of state courts have refused to extend civil liability to
vendors of intoxicating liquors. The Arkansas high court through
Carr v. Turner"7 in 1965 expressed the opinion that such an action
was entirely within the sphere of legislative control and not subject to
judicial interpretation."8 Nebraska, similarly, in a 1976 decision,
Holmes v. Circo," refused to recognize liability for the vendor in actions involving accidents that are alcohol related. The court passed
over the controversy by claiming, likewise, that the power to create
liability was vested in the legislature and not in the judiciary. 20
Nevada, which has statutory law prescribing civil liability for one
who sells alcohol to a minor, refused to extend the liability to a vendor
who sells to one visibly intoxicated. 2' The court, while recognizing
that valid arguments exist for both sides, reasoned that if it had been
within the foreseeability of the legislature to extend liability to such
22
cases, the legislature would have done so.
Even in those states where Dram Shop Acts have been adopted by
state legislatures, problems have arisen as is illustrated in Waynick v.
Chicago's Last Department Store.2 3 In Waynick an automobile accident occurred in Michigan that was the result of consumption of
liquor purchased in Illinois. 2 4 Both states had enacted Dram Shop
Acts, but the Illinois act did not extend liability outside of its state
boundary. 2 5 The court applied the doctrine of negligence per se to
hold the vendor liable under Michigan common law which was
deemed to control. 2 ' The court determined that the seller had breached his duty of care to those other than the consumer and was liable for
the damages and injuries caused as a result."
THE MISSISSIPPI STATUTE AND COURT INTERPRETATION

Following the repeal of Prohibition, the Mississippi Legislature in
1934 adopted a series of laws legalizing and governing the sale of
alcoholic beverages . 2 The primary purpose of these statutes was to
promote the public health of the state's citizenry. The Mississippi
Supreme Court in its opinion in Alexander v. Graves2' gave this interpretation to the legislative motive saying:
"238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656 (1965).

"Id. at 658.
2196

Neb. 496, 244 N.W.2d 65 (1976).

-Id. at 70.
"Hamm v. Carson City Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358 (1969).
"-Id.at 360.
"1269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied 362 U.S. 903 (1960).
"Id. at 324.
251d.
"Id. at 325.
27Id.
"Miss. Laws of 1934, c. 171.
2"178 Miss. 583, 173 So. 417 (1937).
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The Legislature was departing from the policy of total prohibition to a
limited sale of intoxicating liquors. They were aware of the history of
legislation in reference to the sale and possession of intoxicating liquors
dating back many years. It was recognized that there might be portions
of the territory within the county where the sale of beer and wine might
be hurtful to morals and to the safety of the community.... They were
not dealing with a subject entirely harmless within itself. They knew
that such liquors when drunk to excess produced intoxication.... They
knew this to be an age in which the machine is much used-almost universally used in transporting people from point to point; and they knew
that intoxicating liquors impaired both vision and judgment in the
operation of such machines.
Surely, it is as important that the safety and security of the homes of
the smaller towns and rural sections shall also be matters for legislative
consideration, and we think that the Legislature had in mind the securing of the peace and safety of communities wherein the necessity for
regulations to that end exist in the judgment of the board of
supervisors."0
In 1944 the legislature added a provision,"' which is presently in

force, making it unlawful "to sell, give, or furnish any beer or wine to
any person visibly or noticeably intoxicated, or to any insane person,
or to any habitual drunkard, or to any person under the age of
eighteen years."-3 2 The court examined this code provision as a basis

for its decision in Ellard v. State," a criminal case. The facts showed
that the defendant had given beer to a minor but an actual sale was
not involved.3 4 The court construed the statute to mean that a court
can find a defendant guilty on only one charge, "selling, giving, or
furnishing beer to a minor," if the counts are plead conjunctively. 5
The statute was further interpreted in State v. Labella3 in which
the defendant was convicted for selling beer to a minor. The court
held that in order to be convicted of selling intoxicating liquor in
violation of the statute, it is not necessary that the defendant actually
be present at the time of the offense; thus the sale or dispersal may be
the action of an employee or servant.3 This interpretation expanded
criminal liability to owners of establishments in the business of
dispensing alcoholic beverages irrespective of whether the owners
were actually present at the illicit transaction.

"ld. at 594-96, 173 So. at 420-21.
"MIss. CODE ANN. § 10223(1)(b) (Supp. 1944).
"Miss. CODE ANN. § 67-3-53(b) (1972).
"248 Miss. 313, 158 So. 2d 690 (1963).

"Id. at 318, 158 So. 2d at 691.
"Id. at 317-18, 158 So. 2d 691.
"232 So. 2d 354 (Miss. 1970).

"Id at 355-56.
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DRAM SHOP ACTS
ANALYSIS BY THE COURT

In Murnford the court attached civil liability to a vendor of
alcoholic beverages involved in an illegal sale, and thus appears to
have opened up a new area of liability, but the court buried this determination deep within its opinion. The court recognized the existence
of this expanded liability, but reversed the lower court's holding on a
prejudicial jury instruction. This treatment results in a final holding
that is far from clear. In its decision, the court seemingly recognized
the need for the modernization of the proximate cause doctrine from
the common law dictates of consumption and towards the sale in
alcohol related cases. In the words of Judge Hallows, Chief Justice of8
the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in his dissent in Garciav. Hargrove
the basis for the common law beliefs has been "sadly eroded by the
shift from comingling alcohol and horses to comingling alcohol and
''
horsepower. " g
The crux of the court's holding in Munford apparently is that
violation of the statute constitutes negligence per se and by violating
the law, a proprietor of an establishment involved in the sale of
alcoholic beverages passes into the realm of liability to those injured
as a direct result of the sale.4 0 It is the vendor's duty to conform his
business behavior so as not to violate the statute. " ' This seems to be a
common sense holding. The whole chain of events involved in
alcohol-related accidents begins with the sale. 42 The court has reasoned that if a vendor of liquors utilizes due care to see that only
authorized persons purchase his products, he has violated no law and
as such cannot be held accountable for his customers' subsequent actions. It was readily apparent in Munford that the boys were minors.
The evidence as well revealed that the sister of one of the group had
refused to allow her brother to return with the minors to the store to
4
purchase additional beer because they were visibly intoxicated. 1
Coupling this with the fact that the youths were engaged in the driving of an automobile, the foreseeability of potential harm becomes
44
more apparent.
The court's decision, however, leaves unresolved several issues.
For instance, is the extension of civil liability limited only to those
sales involving minors or did the court intend to include those other
groups enumerated in the statute?" The apparent answer is that
"176 N.W.2d 566 (Wis. 1970).
"Id. at 572.
'*368 So. 2d at 217.
"Id. at 218.
"Id. at 216.
"Id. at 218.
"Id. at 217 (quoting from Alexander v. Graves, 278 Miss. 583, 594-95, 173 So. 417,
420 (1937)).
"1MIss. CODE ANN. § 67-3-53(b) (Supp. 1978).
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future holdings will extend liability for the benefit of habitual
drunkards, insane persons, and those noticeably or visibly intoxicated, as well as for minors. The legislature sought to protect these
groups by enacting restrictive sanctions upon the sale and distribution
of alcoholic beverages to them. The judiciary must recognize the protection afforded these special classes in order to further the legislative
purpose behind the statute.
Another unresolved question is how may a vendor of alcoholic
beverages safeguard himself against liability for sales to a minor. The
court states that the method used in determining a minor's age is left
to be determined by the vendor." Although the common custom is to
require some sort of identification such as a driver's license from the
prospective customer, the devious ease of falsification makes this procedure unreliable. Can liability be extended to the vendor who mistakenly sells alcohol to a minor upon belief that he is of majority age?
These are questions the court must resolve in future cases in order to
clarify the imposition of civil liability to vendors of intoxicating
liquors in violation of statute.

Roger Keith Meagher
"See note 36, supra.

